

CLEON'S HIDDEN APPEALS (THUCYDIDES 3.37–40)¹

INTRODUCTION: ΠΡΟΣ ΗΛΟΝΗΝ ΛΕΓΕΙΝ

At 2.65 Thucydides says of Pericles that he did not speak to please (πρὸς ἡδονὴν λέγειν): he had no need of such means for acquiring influence, since he already enjoyed it because of his recognized merits. But his successors were on the same plane as one another, each one striving to establish himself as the man first in influence with the demos. And in this drive for ascendancy, they began to allow the people's pleasures to shape the advice they gave (ἐτράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι).²

The next Athenian speaker we encounter is Cleon; and when we are told that the demos regarded him as their most persuasive speaker,³ we expect from him that gratification of the audience which has been described at 2.65. In *one respect* this is exactly what we see. The savage proposal presented by Cleon at the first assembly gave to the Athenians precisely the vengeance they desired. And in the second speech, the

¹ This paper has greatly benefited from the suggestions of its anonymous referee. I am pleased to take this opportunity to express my gratitude.

² On the phrase πρὸς ἡδονὴν λέγειν and related ideas, see J. de Romilly, 'La condamnation du plaisir dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide', *WS* 79 (1966), 142–8; J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton, 1989), 43–4 (discussed below, n. 8); S. Flory, 'The meaning of τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες (1.22.4) and the usefulness of Thucydides' *History*', *CJ* 85 (1990), 198–200; M. Heath, 'Thucydides' political judgement', *LCM* 15 (1990), 158–60. The following works, cited more than once, will be indicated by author's name only: A. Andrewes, 'The Mytilene debate: Thucydides 3.36–49', *Phoenix* 16 (1962), 64–85; J. A. Andrews, 'Cleon's ethopoetics', *CQ* 44 (1994), 26–39; D. L. Cairns, 'Hybris, dishonour, and thinking big', *JHS* 116 (1996), 1–32; G. Crane, *Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998); N. R. E. Fisher, *Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece* (Warminster, 1992); M. Heath, 'Justice in Thucydides' Athenian speeches', *Historia* 39 (1990), 385–400; S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1991); D. Kagan, 'The speeches in Thucydides and the Mytilene debate', *YCS* 2 (1975), 71–94; J. Th. Kakridis, *Der thukydeische Epitaphios. Ein stilistischer Kommentar* (Munich, 1961); E. Lévy, *Athènes devant la défaite de 404. Histoire d' une crise idéologique* (Paris, 1976); C. W. Macleod, *Collected Essays* (Oxford, 1983); N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Cambridge, MA, 1986); W. Nippel, *Mischverfassungstheorie und Verfassungsrealität in Antike und früher Neuzeit* (Stuttgart, 1980); J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton, 1989); K. A. Raaflaub, *Die Entdeckung der Freiheit* (Munich, 1985); J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (Oxford, 1963); ead., 'Le Thème du prestige dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide', *Ancient Society* 4 (1973), 39–58; ead., *Problèmes de la démocratie grecque* (Paris, 1975); J. S. Rusten (ed), *Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War, Book II* (Cambridge, 1989); H.-G. Saar, *Die Reden des Kleon und Diodotus und ihre Stellung im Gesamtwerk des Thukydides* (diss. Hamburg, 1953); C. Tuplin, 'Imperial tyranny: some reflections on a Classical Greek political metaphor', in P. A. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (edd.), *CRUX: Essays presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix* . . . (Exeter, 1985), 348–75; G. Vlastos, 'ΙΣΟΝΟΜΙΑ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ', in J. Mau and E. G. Schmidt (edd.), *Isonomia. Studien zur Gleichheitsvorstellung im griechischen Denken* (Berlin, 1964), 1–35; reprinted in G. Vlastos, *Platonic Studies* (Princeton, 1973), 164–203; A. W. Gomme, K. J. Dover, and A. Andrews, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 5 vols (Oxford, 1945–81), hereafter *HCT*.

³ 3.36.6 τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος. Cf. 4.21.3. So too the Sicilian demagogue Athenagoras is ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς (6.35.2). On Athenagoras, see below.

one Thucydides has seen fit to relate, Cleon persists in this appeal to *ὀργή*, using (as we shall shortly see) some fine techniques for rekindling that spent anger.⁴

For some, Cleon's appeal to his audience's desire for revenge, coupled with the elements of slander and exploitation of social tensions, is enough to confirm that Cleon is Thucydides' prime illustration of the post-Periclean leadership, as characterized at 2.65.⁵ And yet it is Cleon himself who takes up Thucydides' complaint and denounces both the demagogic flatterers (40.3 οἱ τέρποντες λόγῳ ῥήτορες) and the Athenians themselves for succumbing to pleasure (38.7 ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσώμενοι; cf. 40.2 ἡδονῇ λόγων). Moreover, he begins his speech by harshly upbraiding his audience for the consequences of their democracy, which leads Gomme to comment that 'there is no flattery of the demos by this persuasive demagogue, no letting himself be led by the people'.⁶ How, then, can Thucydides say that Pericles' successors won the support of the demos through fawning and flattery and then give to the first of these successors a speech as outspoken as this?⁷

Cleon's criticism of democratic practices is certainly loud and overt. What is less obvious and more important, he also attacks certain aspects of democratic ideology. This form of criticism takes outspokenness to a dangerous level,⁸ and makes sense only if there is some deeper, hidden appeal. Such is the case in this speech: Cleon's objective is to remove for his audience the ideological impediment to the realization of

⁴ It is not just Cleon but the Athenians as a whole who decry the heinous character of the revolt (3.36.2). This, Salathos' summary execution (3.36.1), and the explicit surrender of the proceedings to *ὀργή* (3.36.2) all make the prevailing mood of the assembly perfectly apparent. For a reconstruction of the arguments at the first assembly, see R. P. Legon, 'Megara and Mytilene', *Phoenix* 22 (1968), 208–9 (followed by Kagan [n. 2], 80–1).

⁵ Andrews (n. 2), 76–7 ('he violently discredits his opponent in advance . . . he appeals to unregulated emotion. . . . Tactics like these should be comprehended in Thucydides' *ἐπράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι*'); L. Edmunds, *Cleon, Knights, and Aristophanes' Politics* (Lanham, MD, 1987), 32 ('Thucydides' Cleon is presented as a source of stasis', in confirmation of the report at 2.65).

⁶ Gomme in *HCT*, vol. II, 299.

⁷ 'Cleon sets himself against the clear tide of public opinion', contrary to what 2.65.10 has led us to expect, remarks D. M. Lewis, *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. V² (Cambridge, 1992), 405–6. Cf. S. Hornblower (n. 2), 420. Of course, the apparent inconsistency between these two passages, 2.65 and 3.37–40, may merely be a reflection of changes in Thucydides' own thinking over the several decades during which he was at work on his history. So de Romilly (n. 2, 1963), 171: 'While in his judgment in 2.65 Thucydides seems particularly concerned to underline the difference between Pericles and his successors, [in the Mytilene Debate] he makes no effort at all to mark the contrast between Pericles and Cleon. . . . The explanation is that between the composition of the debate on Mytilene and the judgment in 2.65, there was an interval: the contrast which had previously seemed unimportant turned out to be essential, and the attacks of the opposition, now triumphant, called for precise justification.' But before we conclude that Cleon's speech is not intended to exemplify the politician who, in contrast to Pericles, makes his advice conform to the likings of his audience, we must investigate what these likings might be. That is the task of this paper. I hasten to add that viewing Cleon's speech as a confirmation of the authorial comments of 2.65 does not require us to view the speech as a late composition, nor to doubt its authenticity. I leave these questions for a later occasion.

⁸ According to Ober (n. 2), 316–24, the rhetor was expected to 'prominently stand forth' and speak his mind, defending, advising, leading, and even criticizing the people. But his outspokenness stopped short of attacking democratic ideology. Here, he was expected to demonstrate 'his ideological solidarity' with his audience (93). What elite critics like Thucydides revile as 'pleasing speech', argues Ober, is in fact nothing more than the speaker's effort to 'accommodate himself to the ethos—the ideology—of his audience' (43). One virtue of Ober's approach is that it shows that the speech was pleasing to the audience not only when it appealed to their emotions but also when it confirmed their opinions (or 'ideological presuppositions').

their unspoken desire for greater power. Consequently, it is not just the audience's passion for revenge that Cleon means to gratify, but also their desire to extend their *ἀρχή*, both within and beyond the city. Neither of these appeals has been adequately appreciated; this paper will treat both.

The body of the speech may be divided into two sections,⁹ in the first of which (3.37–8) Cleon's professed aim is to persuade the Athenians to abandon certain self-destructive democratic tendencies so that they may pursue their proper interests. In the second part (3.39–40.1) he explains to them just where their interests lie: they must enact the Mytilene decree, confident that such action not only is just but also promotes their imperial interests.¹⁰ Underlying these expressed concerns are Cleon's tacit assumptions about his audience's attitudes: in the first section, their attitude toward democratic tolerance and freedom; in the second, toward imperial honour and prestige. The discussion which follows treats each of these, though in reverse order: first imperial honour and prestige, *τιμή*, then democratic tolerance and freedom, *ἐλευθερία*.

I. IMPERIAL HONOUR AND PRESTIGE (3.39–40.1)

'If you follow my advice', says Cleon at the conclusion of his speech (3.40.4), 'you will do what is just toward the Mytileneans as well as what is in your own interest' (*πειθόμενοι μὲν ἔμοι τά τε δίκαια ἐς Μυτιληναίους καὶ τὰ ξύμφορα ἅμα ποιήσετε . . .*).¹¹ The proof of this double assertion is found in the second part of the speech (3.39). Cleon there says that *revolt is pardonable only if involuntary*, that is to say, if occasioned by unendurable Athenian demands or by enemy threats. But the Mytileneans were under neither pressure: the Athenians left the Mytileneans free and indeed accorded them the foremost honours, and the enemy posed no danger, since the Mytileneans were safe behind their walls on an island whose waters their own ships controlled.¹² Such circumstances show, says Cleon, that they were altogether free from constraint: *the revolt was indeed voluntary*, and therefore unpardonable.

It is on this *legalistic* ground that the Athenians must distinguish voluntary rebels from those who have been forced to revolt. But they must do so for political reasons as well: the allies themselves are sensitive to the difference and will be carefully noting whether the voluntary and wilful nature of their revolt will earn for the Mytileneans the harsher punishment; anything less will suggest to them that the Athenian response to revolt is likely never to be severe. Confident of impunity, every ally will regard its own 'slightest excuse' as an apt occasion for revolt. As a result, the Athenians will spend all their time suppressing the revolts of their own allies, either losing them and their resources to the enemy or, at best, recovering cities which they themselves have devastated and rendered incapable of providing imperial revenue.

This, then, is the argument, one part legal and one part political, on the basis of

There is indeed some of the latter in Cleon's speech: see below on *δόξα* and the wisdom of mass decisions. But on the interpretation of the speech advanced here, the pleasure afforded by Cleon's speech involves gratification of desires largely emotional.

⁹ P. Moraux, 'Thucydide et la rhétorique', *ÉC* 22 (1954), 9, labels the former of these an *ἀποτρεπτικός λόγος*, the latter, a *κατηγορικός λόγος*.

¹⁰ Heath (n. 2), 388–9 notes that, relative to other Athenian speakers in Thucydides, Cleon's insistence on considerations of justice is exceptional.

¹¹ In those places where, as here, I have consulted another's translation, I have turned to R. Crawley, as revised in R. B. Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides* (New York, 1996).

¹² Regarding the walls and ships, see. n. 19 and cf. 3.4.2, 3.3.4, 11.6.

which Cleon contends that his policy perfectly reconciles the demands of justice and self-interest. Whatever we may think of it, Cleon has provided a rationale for the Mytilene decree. But he has also embedded in that rationale certain powerful emotional appeals. One of these, the appeal to an Athenian fear of general rebellion, requires no special comment.¹³ The other, an appeal to anger which arises from the argument from justice, is much subtler, and requires close study.

If the Mytileneans had revolted involuntarily, says Cleon at 3.39.2, *that* would have been *ἀπόστασις*. But their revolt, being voluntary, deserves a different name: *ἐπανάστασις*, conspiratorial 'uprising against' the ruler.¹⁴ Moreover, the motives behind a voluntary revolt can differ significantly: as Cleon sees it, a polis may revolt in an attempt to augment its own power. Not so the Mytileneans: 'they attempted to ruin us by siding with our worst enemies—a worse offence than a war undertaken on their own account in the acquisition of power.' The Mytileneans were motivated not by self-interest, but malice pure and simple.

Having thus introduced the question of motives, Cleon devotes the next several sentences to the psychology of the Mytilene revolt, and of revolt in general.¹⁵ The Mytileneans were deterred neither by the adverse outcome of earlier revolts, nor by the danger which lurks for those who enjoy extraordinary blessings (*εὐδαιμονία*). On the contrary, their prosperity induced in them that very attitude of mind which gives rise to evil intentions and the desire to treat others spitefully. And this is not surprising, for 'cities in which prosperity arises very suddenly and quite unexpectedly usually turn to hubris' (3.39.4 *εἶωθε δὲ τῶν πόλεων αἷς ἂν μάλιστα καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστου ἀπροσδόκητος εὐπραγία ἔλθῃ, ἐς ὕβριν τρέπειν*).¹⁶ There is, of course, nothing controversial in this maxim, and illustrations of this 'law of hubris' are numerous enough in the pages of Thucydides.¹⁷ But we may ask on what basis Cleon attributes *εὐδαιμονία* and *εὐπραγία* to the Mytileneans; and we may well wonder in what sense that prosperity arose 'very suddenly and quite unexpectedly'.

The prosperity of which Cleon speaks at 3.39.2 consists in the several benefits of Mytilenean autonomy, and specifically those which prove that their revolt was 'epanastatic' and voluntary: their self-government (*αὐτόνομοι οἰκοῦντες*), the walls which kept them safe from enemy threat by land, and the ships which protected them by sea.¹⁸ These defences it had certainly been in the power of the Athenians to

¹³ See Kagan (n. 2), 79–80.

¹⁴ Cleon characterizes the revolt as *ἐπανάστασις* not so much because he wishes to liken it to domestic revolution (Andrewes in *HCT*, vol. V, 45; cf. Saar [n. 2], 43–4) as to suggest that linguistic usage itself sanctions and supports his notion of two distinct forms of revolt.

¹⁵ Cf. Diodotus' discussion of the subject at 3.45, and D. T. Tompkins, 'Thucydides constructs his speakers: the case of Diodotus', *Electronic Antiquity* 1.1 (June 1993).

¹⁶ Cleon places great emphasis on the Mytileneans' happiness and prosperity (39.3–5 *εὐδαιμονία . . . , εὐπραγία . . . , εὐτυχοῦντα . . . , εὐδαιμονίαν*), and its issue in *ὑβρις*. Gomme in *HCT*, vol. II, 307 and Saar (n. 2), 46 note the contrast with Chios (8.24.4 *ἡδαιμονήσαν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν*).

¹⁷ de Romilly (n. 2, 1963), part III, ch. iii, esp. 322–9. For recent reappraisal of *ὑβρις*, see below, n. 23.

¹⁸ As elements of *αὐτονομία*, neither walls, ships, nor freedom from tribute is necessary or sufficient. As M. Ostwald, *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History* (Chico, CA, 1982), 27–8 observes, the Chians 'demolished their walls at the bidding of Athens in 425 B.C., and yet Chios continued to be considered autonomous down to the time of her revolt in 412 B.C. . . . Participation with her ships (in joint naval campaigns with Athens) makes Methymna *αὐτόνομος* in one passage but *ὑπήκοος* in another. . . . (The Peace of Nicias) guarantees the *αὐτονομία* of six Thracian cities, "provided that they continue to pay the tribute assessed at the time of Aristides".'

remove.¹⁹ Instead, they left them intact, tokens of the esteem in which they held this ally (3.39.2 *τιμώμενοι ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ὑπὸ ἡμῶν*). Thus, the foundation of the islanders' prosperity was the *τιμή* accorded them by the Athenians. And it is precisely this which made their prosperity *ἀπροσδόκητος*. It was shocking and unexpected that the imperial masters, for whom *τιμή* was so important,²⁰ should pay honour to those from whom honour was due.²¹

Thucydides records another instance of a revolt which involved hubris: that of the Corcyreans from their mother-city Corinth. All their other colonies, say the Corinthian representatives at Athens, pay due honour to their mother city (*τιμῶσιν*). But the rebel Corcyreans have grown terribly wealthy, and as a result are in the settled habit of striking out against their mother city from an attitude of hubris (1.38.5 *ὑβρεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐξουσίᾳ πλούτου πολλὰ ἐς ἡμᾶς . . . ἡμαρτήκασιν* . . .). And yet, when the Corinthians first began founding colonies, their expectation was that, far from becoming the victims of their colonies' hubris, they would receive the honour and respect which is properly owed a hegemonic state (38.2 *ὑβρίζεσθαι . . . θαναμάζεσθαι*).²² In this passage, hubris is aggressive behaviour involving the desire to bring *dishonour* to the victim.²³

¹⁹ At this date only Mytilene and Chios retained their navies; each was required, on an ongoing basis, to place a contingent at the disposal of the Athenian navy (3.10.5). These two allies were likewise the only Ionian states to have retained their walls (3.39.2, 4.51; 3.33.2). Doubtless the presence of walls at Mytilene and Chios could be represented to the Greek world as a token of Athenian respect for the autonomy of these two states. This seems to be Cleon's tactic here. Regarding the absence of walls in Ionia, see R. Meiggs *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1979), 149–51, who attributes their removal to Athenian imperial policy (Meiggs is anticipated by P. A. Brunt, 'Athenian settlements abroad in the fifth century', in E. Badian [ed.], *Ancient Society and Institutions. Studies . . .* Victor Ehrenberg [New York, 1967], 84, 92, n. 54). The alternative view, first advanced by H. T. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford, 1958), 219–20, is that the walls had been removed by the Athenians at the time of the Peace of Callias. If this is true, subsequent Athenian imperial policy may have consisted in nothing more than insisting on strict observance of the terms of the Peace. And if allies in the time of the Athenian *ἀρχή* in Thrace were allowed to retain their walls, that is because no 'Peace of Callias' will have existed to protect the allies from hostile neighbors (Andrewes in *HCT*, vol. V, 36). For further discussion and bibliography, see Hornblower (n. 2), 414–15.

²⁰ The Athenians who address the Spartan assembly at 1.75.3 cite *τιμή* together with fear and profit as the fundamental motives of their *ἀρχή*. Scholars have difficulty taking the first of these as seriously as the others: see n. 22, and cf. Lévy (n. 2), 111–19; de Romilly (n. 2, 1963), 79.

²¹ In Thucydides the prosperity or good fortune which leads to hubris is often said to have arisen unexpectedly (de Romilly [n. 2, 1963], 324). One of Cleon's 'sharp practices' is his elision between *ἀπροσδόκητος* as 'unexpected' and as 'sudden'.

²² Crane (n. 2), 97–105 argues that we must take seriously Thucydides' suggestion that what chiefly motivated the Corinthians' 'irrational' decision to 'push the Greek world into . . . war' (96) was the Corcyreans' refusal to perform those symbolic gestures by which they might publicly acknowledge Corinth's cultural superiority. The fundamental issue is, as Thucydides 1.38 supposes, the Corinthians' slighted honour. Cf. de Romilly (n. 2, 1973), 42: 'On dirait . . . que l'honneur commande . . . le conflit des intérêts.' Similarly p. 41: the role played by *τιμή* in this episode 'déroute les historiens modernes et . . . leur semble mince au regard de l'événement; mais c'est l'explication que donne Thucydide'.

²³ For Fisher (n. 2), 148, 'the core of the concept is beyond any doubt the committing of actions of intentional insult, of acts which deliberately inflict shame and dishonour on others'. Cairns (n. 2) accepts the emphasis on honour, but argues that Fisher has incorrectly limited the 'dispositional' aspect of hubris to the intention to insult and dishonour. His emphasis 'is on that element of *hybris* which relates to one's own honour'. He argues that 'the state of mind which over-values one's own honour is decisive for *hybris*. . . . Terms such as *mega phronein* are . . . ways of referring to the subjective, dispositional aspect of *hybris*, and thus, since *hybris*-words can be used in purely dispositional senses, *hybris* and "thinking big" can amount to the same thing' (10–11).

The same may be said of 3.39. The Athenians, says Cleon, ought never to have so honoured the Mytileneans (*τετιμῆσθαι*), for then they would not have committed such outrage (*ἐς τόδε ἐξύβρισαν*). As the maxim which immediately follows makes clear, for the imperial Athenians to surrender their *τιμή* in this way to those under their rule was slavish and weak; and as usually happens, this slavishness was met with scorn and disrespect (3.39.5 *πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὲν θεραπεύον ὑπερφρονεῖν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὑπεῖκον θαναμάζειν*). Thus, the outrage supposed by the words *ἐς τόδε ἐξύβρισαν* was not so much the revolt itself as the public humiliation of imperial Athens. And it is this, and not any material damage resulting from the revolt itself, which makes the Mytileneans *μάλιστα δὴ . . . ἡδίκηκότας ὑμᾶς*, 'guilty of the most grievous injury', one that fully merits the most terrible revenge.

Compelled to justify the harsh decree of which he was the sponsor, Cleon not only states the legalistic and political grounds on which he denies pardon to the Mytileneans for their 'voluntary' revolt; he also suggests that the islanders are guilty of hubris. And nothing so instils—in this case, recaptures—the passion for revenge as a slight, inflicted in a spirit of hubris, to the Athenians' imperial *honour*.²⁴

II. DEMOCRATIC TOLERANCE AND FREEDOM (3.37–8)

Cleon thus devotes the second section of his speech to a legalistic and political justification of revenge which is at the same time a powerful appeal to *anger*. But he begins the speech by decrying the *regret* which has supplanted his audience's original anger; and it is his treatment of this regret that gives rise to Cleon's stunning criticism of his audience and their democracy.²⁵

Behind the Athenians' changed attitude lies the belief that, in pitying the Mytileneans their plight and listening to their pleas, they lose nothing and actually gain the lasting gratitude of the Mytileneans. To this Cleon responds:

You fail to consider that, whatever advantage you miss when you yield to an argument or whatever you concede out of pity, is a display of weakness which is dangerous to yourselves and does not win the gratitude of the allies. You fail to take into account that the empire you maintain is a tyranny, one exercised over those who for their part are laying plots and endure your rule unwillingly. They do not obey you as a result of your doing them favours at your own expense, but as a result of your controlling them, not by good will, but by force. (3.37.2)

²⁴ In order to imagine, with the speaker, how a charge of *ὑβρις* would rekindle the Athenians' spent anger, we may turn to Aristotle's discussion of audience psychology in *Rhetoric* 2. Chapter 2 treats anger (*ὀργή*), which Aristotle defines as 'desire . . . for conspicuous retaliation (*τιμωρία*) because of a conspicuous slight (*ὀλιγωρία*)' (1378a30ff, trans. G. Kennedy). Of the three forms which a slight may take, the most grievous is *ὑβρις*, 'doing and speaking in which there is *shame* to the sufferer, not that some advantage may accrue to the doer or because something has happened but for the pleasure of it' (my italics). (Note Aristotle's further remark that victims of *ὑβρις* are especially provoked when the belittlement is at the hands of friends or those whom they have shown special favour—as the Athenians have the Mytileneans.) In short, nothing so provokes *ὀργή*, i.e. the passion for *τιμωρία*, as aggression, which is perceived as arising from and constituting *ὑβρις*. The passage is central to the 'behaviourist' account of *ὑβρις* offered by Fisher (n. 2) and to the attempt of Cairns (n. 2), esp. 2–8, to redress what he regards as Fisher's under-estimation of the 'dispositional' aspect of *ὑβρις*.

²⁵ Attempting to show the speaker's adoption of an endoxic ethos, Andrews (n. 2), 35, n. 53, downplays the outspokenness of Cleon's opening remarks. In fact, these opening remarks are a bracing assault on democratic principles and practices, the object of which is to *establish the need* for endoxy in matters of justice and self-interest. Cleon's own endoxic ethos in these matters *first* becomes evident at 3.38.1, then repeatedly in 3.39–40.

ὅτι ἂν ἡ λόγῳ πεισθέντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀμάρτητε ἢ οἴκτῳ ἐνδῶτε, οὐκ ἐπικινδύνως ἡγείσθε ἐς ὑμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὴν τῶν ξυμμάχων χάριν μαλακίζεσθαι, οὐ σκοποῦντες ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄκοντας ἀρχομένους, οἳ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν χαρίζησθε βλαπτόμενοι αὐτοὶ ἀκροῶνται ὑμῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐκείνων εὐνοίᾳ περιγένησθε.

As allies, the Mytileneans are neither innocent nor weak, nor is there any prospect that the Athenians can win the Mytileneans' gratitude and adherence (χάριν, χαρίζησθε, ἀκροῶνται, εὐνοίᾳ) through pity (οἴκτῳ) and the neglect of their own interests (ἀμάρτητε, ἐνδῶτε, μαλακίζεσθαι, βλαπτόμενοι). This is because the Athenians are in the position of the tyrant, and as such are dealing with people who, far from allowing themselves to be placed under obligation, will seize this unlooked-for opportunity to harm the Athenians.

By framing his discussion of the Athenians' change of heart in terms of pity, self-sacrifice, and gratitude, Cleon invokes an ethical paradigm, familiar from funeral orations and the tragic stage: throughout their history, the Athenians are the people who, heedless of the consequences for themselves, pity the weak and innocent and rescue them from the unjust oppression of the foreign foe.²⁶ The danger is glorious, not only because it establishes the Athenians' claim of χάρις,²⁷ but because it shows their selfless devotion to the principle of justice among the Hellenes. As Heath remarks, 'the Athenians had constructed an ideal self-image, as the Greek city uniquely concerned with upholding international law, labouring to defend innocent victims to the neglect of her own interests'.²⁸

Cleon's purpose is not to celebrate his audience's defence of justice among the Hellenes, but to bring them face-to-face with the harsh reality which requires that they disregard such foolish idealism: 'the empire you maintain is a tyranny'. The Athenians, Cleon appears to suggest, have unconsciously fallen prey to their own invention: in thinking that they can win gratitude through pity without fatal consequences to themselves, they combine fantasies of invulnerability with their self-idealization as the city generous and just beyond all others.

Cleon takes this behaviour as proof that democracy is incapable of empire. Democracy is blamed in part because the notion of Athenian generosity toward other states is a democratic conceit. But the real problem with democracy is that it fosters the fantasy of security:

I for one have often perceived that democracy is incapable of ruling others, but never more so than by your present change of mind regarding Mytilene. For since fear and cause for suspicion is absent from your daily relations with one another, you feel just the same toward the allies.

(3.37.1–2)

²⁶ The prime examples are the rescue of the Heraclidae and the return of the remains of the Seven to the Argive mothers. Says Loraux (n. 2), 67: 'for the authors of the epitaphioi, these two episodes are an opportunity of recalling this generosity, this compassion for the weak and oppressed, which both tragedy and rhetoric agree are one of the principal features of the Athenian character'.

²⁷ In Thucydides, see Pericles at 2.40.4–5, where the statesman speaks of the Athenians outdoing their friends in kindness (οὐ γὰρ πάσχοντες εὖ, ἀλλὰ δρώντες κτώμεθα τοὺς φίλους). Some do read this passage as a comment on Athenian foreign relations (J. T. Hooker, 'χάρις and ἀρετή in Thucydides', *Hermes* 102 [1974], 164–9; Loraux (n. 2), 81). But Rusten (n. 2), 156 objects that this would be a 'grotesque distortion of the nature of empire, which he later compares to a tyranny'. Pericles' words, says Rusten, 'are meant to apply to the character of individual Athenians'.

²⁸ Heath (n. 2), 394. Cf. (in addition to Loraux in n. 26 above) Kakridis (n. 2), 33.

πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλοτε ἔγνων δημοκρατίαν ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐτέρων ἄρχειν, μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῇ νῦν ὑμετέρᾳ περὶ Μυτιληναίων μεταμελεία. διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε.

The words τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους recall Pericles' celebration of democratic *ἐλευθερία*:

It is with tolerance that we Athenian citizens conduct ourselves both in public affairs and as regards our silent scrutiny of each other's daily activities. We do not grow angry with our neighbour if he does something as he pleases, nor do we cast frowns at him in a way that, while inflicting no actual harm, does nonetheless cause distress. (2.37.2)

ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι' ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ' ἡδονὴν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἄζημίους μὲν, λυπηράς δὲ τῇ ὄψει ἀχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι.

Interpreting *ἐλευθέρως* strictly in relation to the sentence in which it appears, we find Pericles to be saying that Athenian citizens are *tolerant* of one another's private behaviour.²⁹ And it is precisely *ἐλευθερία* in this sense that Cleon wishes to bring before his audience when he echoes Pericles' words: the Athenians' habit of tolerance and generous feelings is what prevents them from viewing the allies with the degree of suspicion and distrust which they, as tyrants, must adopt if they are to survive their subjects' resentment and ill will.³⁰ The clear implication of Cleon's echo of Pericles is that his audience's uncritical adherence to democratic tolerance is what prevents them from a realistic assessment of their imperial predicament. In this way, *ἐλευθερία* renders democracy 'incapable of ruling others'.

Democratic *ἐλευθερία* fosters the notion that empires can be ruled by tolerance and goodwill. But there is another way in which *ἐλευθερία* is deleterious to the interests of Cleon's audience. This becomes evident if we return to the funeral oration.

Having praised the Athenians for their mutual tolerance, Pericles immediately moves to meet the objection that such tolerance invites disrespect for public norms.³¹ No one, says Pericles, is more obedient than an Athenian to his chosen officials or to the laws themselves, not just because he fears legal punishment, but because he is guided in his action by a sense of shame. Thus, for all that they concede extraordinary freedom to one another, the Athenians are an orderly society, observant and respectful of the law.

This is not the view of Cleon. For him, tolerance in their private dealings fosters among the Athenians the fantasy that generosity toward the allies will be met with

²⁹ In translating *ἐλευθέρως* 'with tolerance,' I follow Rusten (n. 2), 146. Cf. J. Classen, *Thukydides*, Band 2 (rev. J. Steup, Berlin, 1914⁵), 175: 'in freier Weise, ohne die in Verfassung und Sitte begründete Freiheit zu beschränken'. I disagree, however, with Rusten's view (147) that *ἐλευθέρως* . . . *πολιτεύομεν* bears only on what follows, τὰ . . . πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν arising merely from Thucydides' habit of antithetical thought. I prefer the view that *ἐλευθέρως* . . . *πολιτεύομεν* is in part a recapitulation of 2.37.1, and that the words τὰ . . . πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν are intended to make that evident. So Gomme in *HCT*, vol. II, 114–15; Kakridis (n. 2), 29–31; J. de Romilly, *Thucydide: La guerre du Péloponnèse, Livre II* (Paris, 1962), 96; Raaflaub (n. 2), 288.

³⁰ On the suspiciousness of the tyrant, see Tuplin (n. 2), 354, 356, with nn. 25 and 33.

³¹ I read 2.37 as Pericles' attempt to distance Athenian democracy from the negative implications of the 'name *δημοκρατία*'. In this I differ with Gomme in *HCT*, vol. II, 110 and follow instead Kakridis (n. 2), 24–8 (esp. 25); J. R. Grant, 'Thucydides 2.37.1', *Phoenix* 25 (1971), 104–7; R. Sealey, 'The origins of *Demokratia*', *CSCA* 6 (1973), 281 (who cites R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes* [Leipzig, 1907], 263 with n. 8); Nippel (n. 2), 50–1; Raaflaub (n. 2), 287. For further discussion of this reading of 2.37, see 'Freedom and equality in Periclean Athens' (forthcoming).

gratitude instead of resentment and danger. That is bad. But a far worse consequence of Athenian *ἐλευθερία* is that it *does* foster disrespect for the laws:

Worst of all will be if nothing in the matter of our decrees will stand firmly established, and if we fail to realize that bad laws which are never subverted are better for a city than good ones that have no authority . . . (3.37.3)

πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιον ἡμῖν μηδὲν καθεστήξει ὧν ἂν δόξη πέρι, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χεῖροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις . . .³²

Cleon is quick to exploit the presumption, refuted by Pericles at 2.37.3, that democratic tolerance leads inevitably to lawlessness. Thus, he hints that the present attempt to repeal the Mytilene decree is a particularly dreadful instance of disrespect for the law.³³ Democratic *ἐλευθερία* breeds lawlessness, say the critics, and Cleon agrees: it makes the Athenians not only too trusting of the allies, but also *too tolerant of those Athenians who treat the laws with contempt*.

It is here that Cleon launches his attack on the *ἀκολασία*, the licentiousness of those intellectuals who participate in debate before the Assembly (3.37.3–5). Cleon begins by contrasting two cities, the stronger of which enjoys stable laws, the weaker, laws that are subject to constant revision. The latter is clearly democratic Athens, while *ἀκίνητοι νόμοι* suggests Sparta. As Saar explains, Cleon rehearses Spartan virtues so as to goad the Athenians into recognizing and correcting their own weaknesses.³⁴

The Corinthians had done very much the same thing when at the congress at Sparta they had explained Athenian strengths in an attempt to persuade the Spartans of the obsolescence of their ways (1.71.2 *ἀρχαιοτροπα ἐπιτηδεύματα*). They began by complaining of their audience's *ἀμαθία*. The Spartans, say the Corinthians, are distrustful of everyone except themselves. When advised by their allies, the Spartans are influenced more by their own suspiciousness than by the instructiveness of the speech itself, and so have come to be characterized by a lack of knowledge in foreign affairs (1.68.1 *ἀμαθία πλέονι πρὸς τὰ ἔξω πράγματα*)—the result of their unwillingness to listen and learn.

What to the Corinthians is a liability is to Cleon a virtue worthy of emulation. But when Cleon urges the Athenians to adopt an attitude of Spartan *ἀμαθία*, it is in the hope that his audience will turn a deaf ear specifically toward those expert advisers who are eager to win a reputation for intelligence.³⁵

There would not normally be much to recommend such Spartan-like *ἀμαθία* to the Athenians. What makes it more attractive, however, is Cleon's claim that such resistance to advice is attended by *σωφροσύνη*, prudence based on strong, independent judgement.

The nature of that prudence which insulates itself from outside advice is best explained by Archidamus in his response to the Corinthians' criticism. The Corinthians began their speech (1.68.1) by conceding that the good faith which pervades Spartan political society—*τὸ πιστόν . . . τῆς καθ' ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτείας καὶ ὁμιλίας*—is the

³² For further discussion of this passage, see below.

³³ Cleon does not bother to explain in what sense the Mytilene decree may be viewed as a law, and its repeal seen as the subversion of *νόμοι*, apparently on the assumption that his audience is at this point more attuned to his criticism of their democracy than to the Mytilene question. Regarding Cleon's apparent equation of decrees and laws, see further below.

³⁴ Saar (n. 2), 28–31.

³⁵ For *ἀμαθία* signifying a refusal to listen, cf. Soph. *O. T.* 545.

source of that city's orderliness (*σωφροσύνη*). But this good faith at home is the very thing which makes the Corinthians distrustful of everyone else, including their own good allies:

Time after time our voice was raised to warn you of the blows about to be dealt us by Athens, and time after time, instead of trying to learn anything from our attempt to educate you, you contented yourselves with suspecting the speakers of being inspired by private interest. (1.68.2)

πολλάκις γὰρ προαγορευόντων ἡμῶν ἃ ἐμέλλομεν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων βλάπτεσθαι, οὐ περὶ ὧν ἐδιδάσκομεν ἐκάστοτε τὴν μάθησιν ἐποιεῖσθε, ἀλλὰ τῶν λεγόντων μᾶλλον ὑπενοεῖτε ὡς ἔνεκα τῶν αὐτοῖς ἰδίᾳ διαφόρων λέγουσιν.

Yet, for all this past frustration, the Corinthians make one more attempt to make the Spartans listen, explaining that the Athenians, ἐκ πολλοῦ προπαρεσκευασμένους (1.68.3), are now in a state of preparedness for carrying their aggression to new levels. The Spartans might well have anticipated this if they had been alert to the singular nature of the Athenians: while the Spartans tarry, the Athenians move aggressively forward, meddling and intervening in others' affairs. The Spartans must realize that the Athenians' relentless activity abroad³⁶ does not allow them, the Spartans, to continue to adhere to their outmoded ways—their slowness, their hesitancy, and their imperturbability.

The Corinthians had limited the meaning of Spartan *σωφροσύνη* to domestic order. But Archidamus defends all the purported Spartan failings—not only their μέλλεις, βραδύτης, and ἡσυχία, but also their refusal to accept instruction from abroad (ἀμαθία)—as proof that Spartan *σωφροσύνη*³⁷ is a matter not only of good order at home but prudence abroad. Neither praise nor blame from foreign allies can persuade the Spartans to undertake risks contrary to their own good judgement (1.84.2 *παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἡμῖν*). And it is precisely their refusal to listen when the preservation of their νόμοι is at question that proves the soundness of that judgement: in the present case, the Corinthians have urged the Spartans to discard their customary imperturbability and invade Attica forthwith, regardless of the fact that the Athenians' military preparation is of an entirely different order, one for which the Spartans and their allies are at present quite unprepared (1.80.3 ἀπαρασκευούς). It would for that reason be disastrous to rush into action, in a way most uncharacteristic of Sparta, without first effecting an adequate ἀντιπαρασκευή.³⁸ Seen in this light, the slowness and hesitancy for which the Corinthians have faulted them is in truth proof of the wisdom of Spartan *σωφροσύνη*. And such wisdom as this makes οἱ ξυνητοί and their expert advice about the enemy's preparations altogether unnecessary.

The Spartans achieve favourable outcomes when dealing with foreign adversaries by refusing to go against their own judgement or to second-guess their norms of behaviour. So too, says Cleon, the Athenians can prosper if they trust in their own good judgement and in the wisdom of *their* νόμοι. Regarding the latter he says:

³⁶ On the question of applying the term *πολυπραγμοσύνη* to this quality of behaviour, see J. W. Allison, 'Thucydides and *πολυπραγμοσύνη*', *AJAH* 4 (1979), 10–22 and the response of K. A. Raaflaub, 'Democracy, power, and imperialism in fifth-century Athens', in J. P. Euben, J. Wallach, and J. Ober (edd.), *Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy* (Ithaca, NY, 1994), 108, n. 9. For additional discussion of the Athenians' alleged relentless activity abroad, see Lévy (n. 2), 121–8.

³⁷ At 1.84.3 Archidamus substitutes τὸ εὐκοσμον as a synonym for *σωφροσύνη*. Cf. E. G. Marchant, *Thucydides, Book I* (London, 1905; repr. Bristol, 1982), 223.

³⁸ On the central role of *παρασκευή* in Archidamus' argument, see J. W. Allison, *Power and Preparedness in Thucydides* (Baltimore, 1989), 45–60.

Ordinary people, because they mistrust their own cleverness, are content to be less learned than the laws, and less able to pick holes in the speech of a good speaker; and being equal judges rather than competing rivals, generally conduct affairs successfully. (3.37.4)

οἱ δ' (sc. οἱ φαυλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων) ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐξ αὐτῶν ξυνέσει ἀμαθέστεροι μὲν τῶν νόμων ἀξιούσιν εἶναι, ἀδυνατώτεροι δὲ τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος μέμψασθαι λόγον, κριταὶ δὲ ὄντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μάλλον ἢ ἀγωνισταὶ ὀρθοῦνται τὰ πλείω.

Ordinary people, because they frankly accept their intellectual limitations, defer to the wisdom of the laws. Just as important, they do not venture to compete with those who, by finding fault with other speakers, eagerly display their own brilliance. Avoiding such individualistic competition, they serve instead as *κριταὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου*, equal partners in the joint task of reaching a sound judgement.³⁹ And in this they are generally successful: ordinary people, *if simply left to come to their own conclusions*, can be depended on to reach a wise collective decision.

This is of course a distinctly democratic sentiment, one which, according to Ober, should be read as a fundamental tenet of Athenian democratic ideology. Stated in full, it is the belief that 'the collective wisdom of a large group was inherently greater than the wisdom of any of its parts'.⁴⁰ Ober takes as his prime fifth-century illustration Athenagoras' remark in Book Six that 'none can hear and decide so well as the many'.⁴¹ But Ober cites Cleon too, noting that he expresses the idea in 'an extreme form'.⁴²

What makes Cleon's allusion to the wisdom of mass decisions extreme is the conclusion he draws from it:

ὥς οὖν χρὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς ποιῶντας μὴ δεινότητι καὶ ξυνέσεως ἀγῶνι ἐπαιρομένους παρὰ δόξαν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλῆθει παραινεῖν. (3.37.5)

'We speakers', says Cleon, 'should do likewise and not allow ourselves to be so carried away by eloquence and intellectual rivalry that we give advice which runs counter to *what has seemed best to you, the people*.' Cleon seems to be speaking of the mass decision, that is, the decree of the popular assembly: *παρὰ <τὸ> δόξαν*, as it has sometimes been emended.⁴³ Such is its wisdom that the speakers themselves, in performing their advisory function, should put aside their selfish intellectual pretensions and emulate its greater wisdom. Were Cleon speaking specifically of the Mytilene decree, this might make sense: rather than subjecting the Mytilene question to renewed analysis, they should defer to the wisdom of this mass decision. But Cleon

³⁹ S. Hornblower (n. 2), 425 glosses *κριταὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου* 'being impartial judges' [lit. 'judges from a position of equality']. But these two ideas should be distinguished: the issue is not that ordinary people impartially judge the various proposals, but that they respect the equal status which they share among themselves. Ordinary people are content to remain equals and peers, in contrast to the desire of intellectual advisers to win personal distinction for themselves—to achieve unequal, or elite, status.

⁴⁰ Ober (n. 2), 163–4, stressing the testimony of Aristotle, *Pol.* 1281a39–b9. Cf. J. A. O. Larsen, 'The judgment of antiquity on democracy', *CP* 49 (1954), 4–5; de Romilly (n. 2, 1975), 66–71; Nippel (n. 2), 50, n. 30 (who cites E. Braun, 'Die Summierungstheorie des Aristoteles', *JÖAI* 44 [1959], 157–84).

⁴¹ Ober (n. 2), 164. 6.39.1 ἐγὼ δὲ φημι . . . φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλευῶσαι δ' ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετούς, κρίναι δ' ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς . . . On the relation of the democratic principles espoused in the Sicilian speeches to Athenian democracy, see (with Ober [n. 2], 164, n. 22) A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Oxford, 1957), 43.

⁴² Ober (n. 2), 164, n. 22.

⁴³ Andrews (n. 2), 36, n. 58.

obviously is not limiting discussion to the present decree,⁴⁴ and therefore seems to be saying that *all* decrees are wise decisions.

In order to appreciate the nature of this wisdom, we must consider the implications of the *ξυνέσεως ἀγώνι*. Wishing to demonstrate their powers of persuasion (*δεινότης*), politicians eagerly engage in an *intelligence contest*, in the course of which they put forth views contrary to the ordinary—or, as Cleon puts it, ‘urge you the people to accept what runs counter to *δόξαν*’. We are forced to wonder whether Cleon is speaking of repeal of a decree, *τὸ δόξαν*, or novel ideas at odds with the ordinary view, *τὴν δόξαν*.⁴⁵ That his awkward omission of the definite article is intended to create such a confusion between decrees and ordinary opinion is confirmed when, in the very next sentence (38.1), Cleon charges that his opponent is planning to base his attack on the Mytilene decree on certain paradoxical ideas about justice and self-interest. What Cleon gains from the ambiguity, as I have argued on an earlier occasion,⁴⁶ is a suggestion that advising the people, in a matter of justice and self-interest, contrary to an existing decree necessarily involves the employment of arguments which are paradoxical and absurd.⁴⁷

Archidamus spoke only of the Spartans’ refusal to go against their own better judgement (*παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν*). But in Cleon’s Athens what makes the judgement of the assembly a better and wiser decision is that it is a *mass* decision. And when the people, *τὸ πλῆθος*, invite their speakers to give advice *παρὰ δόξαν* and to argue for policies based on paradoxical views of justice and self-interest, they become guilty of granting too much freedom to the intellectual élite. They create and condone a permissive and lawless political society, and so become the victims of their own ideology of tolerance. This is indeed *πάντων δεινότατον*, far the worst consequence of the Athenians’ democratic *ἐλευθερία*.⁴⁸

III. EQUALITY, PLEONEXIA, AND ‘TYRANNY’

That *σωφροσύνη* which is preserved by the refusal to listen to intellectuals turns out to be nothing more than a prudent adherence to the wisdom of mass decisions. But the *ἀμαθία* itself has its own constitutional implications. In order to appreciate what these are, we need to return briefly to Athenagoras’ remark in Book Six on the capacity of the many for wise decisions.

Athenagoras claims that foremost among those who foretell an Athenian invasion are young oligarchs, who hope that their countrymen, panic-stricken, will invite them to take charge of affairs, and so ‘rule the city all by themselves’ (6.38.2 *αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἀρχεῖν*). Athenagoras then asks the young oligarchs to confess the true source of their dissatisfaction with democratic rule. Is it that they chafe under the law which prohibits them from assuming positions of leadership until they have attained a certain age? Or is it that they refuse to accept their fellow-citizens as their equals and so share with the many the same citizen rights (6.38.5 *μετὰ πολλῶν ἰσονομείσθαι*)?

⁴⁴ Note the generalizing expressions: *ἐπὶ τὸ πλεον ἄμεινον οἰκοῦσι, τῶν αἰεὶ λεγομένων, τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι, ὀρθοῦνται τὰ πλείω*.

⁴⁵ As Gomme in *HCT* vol. II, 302 observes, the normal sense of *παρὰ δόξαν* in Thucydides is ‘contrary to expectation’.

⁴⁶ Andrews (n. 2), 36–7.

⁴⁷ Cleon indicates what he regards to be his audience’s endoxic truths regarding justice and self-interest in the next sentence (3.38.1). For discussion, see Andrews (n. 2), esp. 32–3.

⁴⁸ Cleon in 3.38 will take his audience to task for their permissiveness, explaining it in terms of their fondness of intellectual display. For discussion, see Andrews (n. 2), 38.

Athenagoras imagines one of their number raising the objection that, on the practical level, this concept of equality, whereby equal regard is accorded to all citizens merely on the basis of their citizenship, renders democracy inept: a city must be led, and those best suited to lead (*ἀρχεῖν*) are the wealthy. Moreover, it is just that this privileged class refuse to share its prerogatives with those citizens who are less deserving (6.38.5 *δίκαιον . . . μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιούσθαι*). Democracy, however, compels the wealthy to do just that. Thus, for all that it claims *ἰσονομία*, democracy, besides being foolish, is downright unfair (*δημοκρατίαν οὕτε ξυνετὸν οὕτ' ἴσον*).⁴⁹

In what follows, Athenagoras suggests that the disaffected few have misunderstood the nature of democratic *ἰσονομία*. Equal political participation in the Syracusan democracy is accorded not to all citizens individually, but to three *μέρη*, the three divisions of the citizen-body, each one of which has its proper competence: the rich, who best know how to manage the city's resources; the astute, who are best at advice and deliberation; and the many, who are most capable of sound decisions. The three segments enjoy equal shares both as discrete units of the city (*κατὰ μέρη*) and as constituent parts of the whole (*ξύμπαντα*). Thus, in contrast to oligarchy, which elevates one *μέρος* over the rest, *ἰσονομία* preserves *ξύμπαν*, the *all-embracing* political entity denoted by the term '*δῆμος*'.⁵⁰

Cleon is likewise concerned with *τὸ ἴσον*, but not of the various divisions of 'the entire people' (*ξύμπαν*), the *demos* in the comprehensive sense, but only of the individual members of one division, *τὸ πλῆθος*. And the issue is not the equal political rights of these individuals, but the common basis on which they reach their decisions: *δόξα*, the collective wisdom of ordinary views, in contrast to the intelligence and expertise which distinguishes one small élite, *οἱ ξυνετοί*. The former, content to be equal to one another, 'guide most matters aright' (37.4 *ὀρθοῦνται τὰ πλείω*). Those, however, who most often cause their city's setbacks are the expert advisers, and this is because of each one's effort to demonstrate that his intelligence transcends all others'. This refusal to conform has catastrophic results, and brings into question such an individual's claim to political equality. In short, the Athenians' advisers should observe the principle of *intellectual equality*, and should do so by refraining from advice which clashes with ordinary views. *μὴ παρὰ δόξαν παραινεῖν*: this is what it is to *advise ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου*. Speakers who do otherwise ought not to be invited to speak at all.⁵¹

⁴⁹ On *ἴσος* in the sense 'fair,' see Vlastos (n. 2), 184–5, n. 78. On the relation of Athenagoras' hypothetical debate to the question of arithmetic and geometric equality, see F. D. Harvey, 'Two kinds of equality', *CM* 26 (1965), 102; de Romilly (n. 2, 1975), 151 with 49–52; Raaflaub (n. 2), 298 with n. 174. The discussion of Nippel (n. 2), 49–50 is apposite. On *ἰσονομία* in connection with the Athenian democracy, see most recently J. Ober and C. Hedrick (edd.), *Dēmokratia. A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern* (Princeton, 1996), which contains several discussions of Athenian democratic equality. For previous bibliography, see K. A. Raaflaub's entry, 'Equalities and inequalities in Athenian democracy', 164, nn. 44, 47.

⁵⁰ E. C. Marchant, *Thucydides Book VI* (London, 1897), 184 explains *καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα*: 'as separate *μέρη* of the *δῆμος* and as together making it up. The words are introduced for the sake of the reference to *ξύμπαν* and *μέρος* above—a point missed by edd.' *Pace* Dover in *HCT* vol. IV, 305–6 (followed by Nippel [n. 2], 50, n. 31), I doubt that Athenagoras is here making claims about individual rights and privileges.

⁵¹ On the right of public speech, see K. A. Raaflaub, 'Des freien Bürgers Recht der freien Rede. Ein Beitrag zur Begriffs- und Sozialgeschichte der athenischen Demokratie', in *Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte. Festschrift F. Vittinghoff* (Cologne and Vienna, 1980), 7–57 (cf. Raaflaub [n. 2], 277–83). According to Raaflaub, anxiety in the 430s over the possibility that social class would re-emerge as a criterion for political involvement led to currency of a new term, *παρησία*: the freedom of each citizen, regardless of social class, to speak as he wished (*ισηγορία*, which

The masses must abandon their habit of *ἐλευθερία*, tolerance and open-mindedness, and adopt instead an attitude of *ἀμαθία*, a refusal to listen when they encounter advisers who consider the political acumen of their audience as grossly unequal to their own. This amounts to a silencing of dissenting opinion, which carries a clear implication of 'mass tyranny'. This becomes clear if we once more return to Athenagoras' speech.

According to Athenagoras, the share of political power accorded the wealthy few is fair and, if anything, more than equal to that accorded the other divisions of the demos.⁵² If they accept this share, *ἴσον καὶ πλεόν*, they will 'advance the interests of the city, the common interest of us all' (6.40.1 *τὸ τῆς πόλεως ξύμπασι κοινὸν αὐξέτε*). But if they prefer to *seize* this greater share rather than accept it in the form given them, they will clearly be aspiring to oligarchy, which 'does not merely seek more than its share of the advantages, but takes and keeps to itself all there is' (6.39.2 *τῶν δ' ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντ' ἀφελομένη ἔχει*). It is precisely this *πλεονεξία* of the wealthy few, and their desire for *ἀρχή*, 'sole rule over the city' (6.38.2 *αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχειν*), which in the past has led to stasis in Syracuse and to the rule of political cliques⁵³ and tyranny.

Tyranny, on this account, results from the *pleonexia* of one segment of the demos, unwilling to content itself with *τὸ ἴσον*, its fair share of political power and aiming instead to claim sole rule for itself.⁵⁴ It is precisely this kind of desire for a disproportionate share of political power, greater than that enjoyed by other divisions of the polis, with which Cleon entices the Athenian *πλήθος*. Certainly they judge and decree, as do *οἱ πολλοί* in Athenagoras' Syracuse,⁵⁵ but they also compel their advisers to espouse the views on justice and self-interest which they themselves, as ordinary people, already generally hold. Diodotus, of course, will denounce this for what it is, an attempt to silence debate. Yet the fact that 'Diodotus is compelled to spend a good third of his time laboriously establishing his right merely to speak at all'⁵⁶ suggests that Cleon's attempt is not without effect. To his great distress, Diodotus understands that the Athenian *πλήθος*, in their desire for greater political power for themselves, can be persuaded to dispense with the experts and to reserve their attention for that speaker

lacked the social implications of *παρρησία*, nonetheless continued in existence alongside the new democratic term). On this interpretation, *παρρησία*, 'freedom of speech', expresses no less a positive democratic concept than *ἰσηγορία*, 'equality of speech'. It is tempting to see these two concepts lurking behind Cleon's discussion: equality of speech, *ἰσηγορία*, involves the responsibility not to say anything which is at odds with *δόξα*, the wisdom of the masses, while *παρρησία* is to presume the right to say absolutely anything at all (*παν-ρησία*: see Raaflaub, *Studien*, 18, 49, n. 60), even that which contradicts conventional views on justice and self-interest. Perhaps Cleon is turning an 'elitist' denigration of *παρρησία* against the enemies of democracy: *παρρησία* is indeed an evil thing, if it means the freedom of *élite intellectuals* to make light of ordinary views and the decrees of the people's assembly.

⁵² On the dual sense of *ἴσος* (equal, fair), see above, n. 49.

⁵³ *δυναστεία* (6.38.3). The Thebans (3.62.3) draw a distinction between *ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος*, oligarchy which respects the principle of a fair distribution of political rights, and *δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν*, which they say most closely approximates to tyranny. We may infer that *δυναστεία* (and tyranny as well: see n. 58) is characterized by disregard for *τὸ ἴσον* and by *πλεονεξία*, the desire to garner to oneself all power, in violation of the principle of *ἰσονομία*, a fair distribution of rights. On the Theban *ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος*, see Vlastos (n. 2), 178–83.

⁵⁴ On *τὸ ἴσον* and *πλεονεξία*, see Vlastos (n. 2), 185, n. 78. R. Balot's presentation at a recent meeting of the American Philological Association, 'Text and context: *pleonexia* in revolutionary Athens', discussed the role of these closely interrelated concepts in the civil discord of 411 and 404; see *APA Abstracts* 1998.

⁵⁵ And as do the people in Pericles' Athens: 2.40.2.

⁵⁶ Andrews (n. 2), 72.

who, like Cleon, clearly demonstrates that, when it comes to matters of justice and self-interest, his is the voice of the masses themselves.⁵⁷

Cleon supposes that the Athenian *πλήθος* is susceptible to the same *pleonexia*, desire for 'sole rule', as are Athenagoras' oligarchs, and that, if given the chance, they will seek a share of power which is more than equal. And, just as at Syracuse, such *pleonexia* bodes tyranny—in this case, a metaphorical tyranny of the masses. But as Cleon's pronouncement at 3.37.2 shows, tyranny can be used metaphorically also of imperial states which disregard claims of *τὸ ἴσον*, equality and fairness, and instead pursue sole and absolute rule over others.⁵⁸ Two notable implausibilities in this speech show that Cleon also appeals to imperial *pleonexia*, the desire of the masses to rule *the allies* in the fashion of the tyrant, without regard for the principle of fairness and equality. The first implausibility concerns justice, the second, law.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ On this speech as evidence for a democratic 'establishment mentality', see M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986), 253–4. Regarding Cleon's pose as the champion of *δόξα* and endoxic reasoning, see Andrews (n. 2). It should now be apparent that this endoxic ethos is intended to exploit the audience's assumptions about *δόξα* and mass wisdom. Part of its hidden attractiveness is its tacit appeal to these ideological presuppositions.

⁵⁸ Tuplin (n. 2) is critical of what he judges to be extravagant scholarly claims about the origins and significance of the imperial tyranny metaphor. 'The truth is that direct characterizations of tyranny, when dealing with general features at all, mostly dwell on the illegitimacy, lawlessness, unrestrained power, dependence on force and arrogance of the tyrant, that other metaphorical uses of tyranny evidently derive from such characteristics, and that there is no good reason to require more of its application to empire' (366). One of those characterizations is 'the obvious point that the autocrat, once installed, necessarily denies *equality* to those around him' (365; my italics). And indeed Tuplin supplies a whole series of fifth- and fourth-century texts in which 'the opposition between tyranny and *equality* is . . . explicit' (364–5; my italics). That Cleon encourages his audience to aspire to what is unfair and unequal and to exercise the resulting power without regard for *τὸ ἴσον* is, I believe, evident. Representing the expert advisers' exercise of free and equal speech as a display of contempt for the ordinary views of the masses, he tempts the *πλήθος* to arrogate to themselves the right to decide who is fit to speak. This is *ἀνίσον*, as are too the attempt to keep the Mytileneans' case from being heard and the use of law to intimidate the allies (see below). Finally, Cleon urges the Athenians to punish the Mytileneans, if necessary, 'contrary to what is fair' (3.40.4 *παρὰ τὸ εἰκός*). Cleon is appealing to the *pleonexia* of the masses, their *appetite for a share greater than equal*. Thus, to the extent that *τὸ ἀνίσον* is understood as a characteristic of tyranny, Cleon's own use of the imperial tyranny metaphor must be seen as prescriptive as well as descriptive. There is some force in Tuplin's objection that we see no 'denial of erstwhile equality' in the passages cited by K. A. Raaflaub, 'Polis Tyrannos: zur Entstehung einer politischen Metapher', in G. W. Bowersock *et al.* (edd.), *Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox* . . . (Berlin and New York, 1979), 237–52—'and this despite the fact that it *does* appear in other imperial contexts' (365). This objection could perhaps be met by showing that the injustice with which the imperial state is charged involves violation of *distributive* justice, where the issue is precisely each state's fair share (*ἴσον*).

⁵⁹ Scholars who scrutinize Cleon's reasoning find much to fault. See, in addition to R. P. Winnington-Ingram (next note): Gomme in *HCT*, vol. II, 299–300, 304, 307, 310; Hornblower (n. 2), 430, 431, 432; Saar (n. 2), 44, 46. For the view that the fallacies and inconsistencies of Cleon's speech should be viewed as part of a larger Thucydidean programme, see Macleod (n. 2), 88–102; P. E. Arnold, 'The persuasive style of debates in direct speech in Thucydides', *Hermes* 120 (1992), 44–57. Macleod, closely studying how Cleon (and the Mytileneans and Diodotus) employ reason in their effort to persuade, is keenly interested in rhetorical technique. Nonetheless, whether the audience is persuaded or not is secondary for him. What matters is the manner in which the historian 'discover(s) to his readers the limits, or the failures, as well as the powers, of reasoning' (88). Arnold takes the view that Thucydides' intention in the speeches is to re-create for a reading audience the experience of listeners exposed to sophistic reasoning; and since readers, having the text before them, are less susceptible to fallacy, Thucydides employs in the speeches a style designed to make the logical difficulties less readily apprehended.

The premise from which Cleon begins his speech is that the Athenians' rule is a tyranny and that the allies therefore are her enemies, ἐξ ἀνάγκης . . . καθεστῶτας αἰεὶ πολεμίους (3.40.3). Yet this assertion is hardly consistent with the middle section of the speech, where Cleon decries the Mytileneans' 'insurrection' against their Athenian benefactors as the most egregious act of injustice (3.39.1). As Winnington-Ingram remarks, 'if the imperial city and her subjects are *ex hypothesi* enemies, then it cannot be unjust for the subject to harm the tyrant, though it is just for him to retaliate'.⁶⁰ Cleon himself seems to recognize the inconsistency when, after assuring his audience that his policy satisfies the demands of both justice and self-interest, he abruptly says:

But suppose you really have no right to rule. Nonetheless, if you are determined to continue this enterprise, you must also punish the Mytileneans, as your interests require and, yes, without regard for fairness. (3.40.4)

εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ οὐ προσήκον ὅμως ἀξιοῦτε τοῦτο δρᾶν, παρὰ τὸ εἰκός τοι καὶ τούσδε ξυμφόρων δεῖ κολάζεσθαι.

The commentators object to Cleon's disregard for moral and logical consistency.⁶¹ But if Cleon's audience are willing to adopt the attitude of the tyrant, as indeed according to Cleon they must, then they will find nothing offensive in the assumption that justice does not affect the issue unless it can be shown to serve the tyrant's own personal interests. The empire is a tyranny, and a tyrant, being always in mortal danger,⁶² must define justice in terms of self-preservation. And it is no concern whether this involves the tyrant in some illogic: as Euphemus will say, for imperial cities as for individual tyrants, 'nothing is illogical provided it is expedient' (6.85.1 ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὅτι ξυμφέρον . . .).

To this extent, then, Cleon's argument not only asserts that the Athenian empire is a tyranny, but also assumes that the Athenians will adopt the attitudes of the tyrant. The same, however, cannot be said for his discussion of law. For whereas it is often said of tyrants that they deprive the city of its νόμοι,⁶³ Cleon strenuously appeals to his audience to see to it that the laws are preserved and respected. Indeed, the parallels with Archidamus' speech which we have noted suggests that Cleon is the advocate of ἐννομία.

The matter requires closer study. Cleon says:

πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιον ἡμῖν μηδὲν καθεστήξει ὧν ἂν δόξῃ πέρι, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χεῖροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις . . . (3.37.3)

It is usually said that Cleon here is equivocating. Gomme, for example, remarks that

⁶⁰ R. P. Winnington-Ingram, 'TA ΔΕΟΝΤΑ ΕΠΙΕΙΝ: Cleon and Diodotus', *BICS* 12 (1965), 76. Hornblower (n. 2) 422–3 minimalizes the difficulty.

⁶¹ Gomme in *HCT*, vol. II, 310: 'a cynical and ruthless logic, which is, strictly, inconsistent with the bold assertion of the tyranny in 37.2'. Cf. M. M. MacKenzie, *Plato on Punishment* (Berkeley, 1981), 118: 'The hopeless tangle of (Cleon's) disjunctive argument may be encapsulated thus: on the one hand, it is just to punish (the Mytileneans), therefore they should be punished, and this will also be expedient; on the other hand, it is expedient to punish them, whether it be just or not, therefore they should be punished.' See too D. Cohen, 'Justice, interest, and political deliberation in Thucydides', *QUCC* 16 (1984), 48.

⁶² Tuplin (n. 2), 354 with n. 25.

⁶³ Commenting on the *enlightened* tyranny of the Peisistratids, Thucydides remarks that αὐτῇ ἢ πόλις τοῖς πρὶν κειμένοις νόμοις ἐχρήτο (6.54.6).

'Kleon . . . is confusing ψήφισματα with νόμοι; the laws of Athens would not be affected by the rescinding of an executive decree.'⁶⁴ There is, however, a special sense in which the Mytilene decree *can* be construed as a law.

The tyrant city, Cleon has said at 37.2, must guard itself against its subjects' hatred by asserting force (ἰσχύς). But it is not until 39.7–8 that Cleon explains what this means: it is only by inflicting exemplary punishment on the Mytileneans that the Athenians will deter further revolt in the empire. He sums up this policy with great succinctness in his parting injunction (40.7): *κολάσατε δὲ ἀξίως τούτους τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις παράδειγμα σαφὲς καταστήσατε, ὃς ἂν ἀφιστήται, θανάτῳ ζημωσόμενον*. The Athenians must 'lay down an unmistakable precedent', and must thereafter prevent anyone from tampering with it. It is this idea of a *παράδειγμα σαφές* which seems to be anticipated at 37.3: if nothing will be firmly established 'on those matters which our decrees address', there will be no fixed precedents to serve as the 'law' of empire.⁶⁵

Cleon does indeed call upon his audience to preserve and respect the laws. But the object of this respect is not at all the conventional *εὐνομία* which rescues the polis from internal disorder, but the self-preservation of the polis from the external threats posed by those who hate and resent imperial tyranny. As with his remarks about justice, so too what he has to say about law is motivated by the tyrant's narrow self-interest. In both of these areas, Cleon wants his audience to imagine that they really *are* tyrants, and to speak and act with the *disregard for fairness*, τὸ ἴσον, and for all *claims of equality* which is characteristic of the tyrant.⁶⁶

If advisers who dissent from the audience's usual views on justice and self-interest are denied the freedom to speak, the masses are free to act as they wish, irresponsibly and without accountability. Imperial tyrant that they are, what they decree becomes law, before which there is no appeal. As tyrant, the Athenian demos is free to act as it pleases. And the tyrant's true adviser is that person who, like Cleon, refuses to speak against the wisdom of what the tyrant, guided by his ordinary views on justice and self-interest, has decreed, and who is also prepared to argue that justice is relevant to the decision only to the extent that it affirms what is in the self-interest of the tyrant. The freedom of the tyrant thus is evident not only when the *πλήθος* acts as it pleases,

⁶⁴ Gomme in *HCT*, vol. II, 300. Cf. Macleod (n. 2), 69. However, M. H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford, 1991), 161–2 claims that the difference in the fifth century between νόμος and ψήφισμα is merely a matter of emphasis, whereby νόμος stresses the contents of a rule, ψήφισμα its enactment. Says Hornblower (n. 2), 423–4 (who had before him an earlier discussion of νόμος and ψήφισμα by Hansen): 'on the technical point Hansen seems right; but there is no denying that Kleon is trading on the reassuring associations of *nomos*'.

⁶⁵ In construing ὧν ἂν δόξη περί as περί τούτων, *περί ὧν ἂν δόξη*, I follow J. Classen, *Thukydides*, Band 3 (rev. J. Steup, Berlin, 1892³), 65. Saar (n. 2) 26 interprets the relative clause as *περί τούτων, ἃ ἂν δόξη*, even though (as Saar himself recognizes), the attraction of the nominative relative pronoun to the genitive of its antecedent is very irregular. That νόμος can be used to refer to a precedent is seen from 1.40.4–6, where the Corinthians urge the Athenians not to intervene on behalf of the Corcyraeans lest they establish the precedent (νόμον καθιστάναι) whereby either they or the Peloponnesians may bring aid to states who defect from the rival camp. Further, Diodorus evidently has the παράδειγμα of 3.40.7 in mind when he says (3.45.3): οὐκ ἔστι νόμος ὅστις ἀπείρξει τούτου (sc. τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν). Given the limited role accorded to precedent in Athenian law itself (S. C. Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law* [Oxford, 1993], 49–63, esp. 60–1), this use of νόμος to express the idea of a precedent is perhaps surprising.

⁶⁶ Compare Zeus in Aesch. *P.V.*, who preserves his rule through laws of his own making (403 ἰδίοις νόμοις κρατύνει), and for whom justice is no more than his freedom to satisfy his own interests (186–7 *παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ δίκαιον ἔχει*).

but when it maintains advisers who *speak* so as to gratify its desires.⁶⁷ If Cleon attacks and undermines the freedom that guarantees the right of élite advisers to counsel the Athenians against their inclinations, he also gratifies his audience's pleonectic desire for sole rule, and with it a form of freedom more ochlocratic than democratic: the freedom of the tyrant *πληθος*, both at home and abroad.⁶⁸

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⁶⁷ Cf. Soph. *Ant.* 506–7 ἀλλ' ἡ τυραννὶς πολλά τ' ἄλλ' εὐδαιμονεῖ καῖεστιν αὐτῇ δρᾶν λέγειν θ' ἃ βούλεται.

⁶⁸ If both Cleon and Pericles, when addressing the Assembly, were able rhetorically to exploit the Peloponnesian charge of imperial tyranny, then perhaps it was possible actually to give the charge a positive spin: 'Gewiß, wir herrschen wie ein Tyrann, aber bedenkt doch, wie herrlich und beneidenswert die Herrschaft eines Tyrannen ist!' So K. A. Raaflaub, 'Athens "Ideologie der Macht" und die Freiheit des Tyrannen', in W. Schuller *et al.* (edd.), *Studien zum Attischen Seebund* (Konstanz, 1984), 76. Raaflaub would explain this frank acceptance of the charge of imperial tyranny as the final development of the Athenians' distinctive notion of absolute freedom. Objects Tuplin (n. 2), 362: 'Of course, granted the "Konzeption der absoluten Freiheit" (which is anyway the really important part of Raaflaub's article . . .), Athenians might logically exult in their tyranny. But there is no evidence that they did.' Open exultation is indeed missing. But I do believe that Cleon's speech at least demonstrates a Thucydidean speaker's conviction that the Athenians were prepared to view their need to rule harshly as an opportunity to transgress *τὸ ἴσον*, in the manner of the tyrant (above, n. 58), both at home and abroad. On the question of the Athenians' imperial tyranny, see (in addition to the articles by Raaflaub and Tuplin): V. Hunter, 'Athens tyrannis', *CJ* 69 (1973/4), 120–6; W. R. Connor, 'Tyrannis polis', in J. H. D'Arms and J. W. Eadie (edd.), *Ancient and Modern: Essays in Honor of G. F. Else* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1977), 95–109; W. Schuller, *Die Stadt als Tyrann—Athens Herrschaft über seine Bundesgenossen* (Konstanz, 1978); Raaflaub (n. 58), 237–52; T. F. Scanlon, 'Thucydides and tyranny', *CA* 6 (1987), 286–301; P. Barceló, 'Thukydides und die Tyrannis', *Historia* 39 (1990), 401–25. For bibliography on 'popular tyranny', as well as a variety of discussions of the subject, see the forthcoming collection of essays under that title, edited by K. A. Morgan.